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Economic cycles in the United States 




This article analyses the business cycles recorded in the 
US and in the euro area over recent decades on the basis 
of the estimated results of a general equilibrium model. 
The analysis is in line with the recent economic literature 
on cyclical movements which ascribes those movements 
to various types of exogenous shocks, such as changes in 
productivity, the labour supply, consumer preferences or 
economic policy. This type of decomposition of the cycli-
cal movements in the main macroeconomic aggregates is 
discussed on the basis of the models estimated for the US 
and the euro area. The results broadly correspond with 
those published elsewhere in the literature. Such an analy-
sis can be conducted for the average of the period under 
review, but is even more informative if it is carried out for 
speciﬁ  c periods to identify the key factors triggering the 
principal recessions or recoveries. If it is applied to the 
most recent period, such an analysis can provide useful 
information not only for the policy to be pursued, but also 
for prediction exercises.
Apart from the origin of the cyclical movements, the 
downward trend in the volatility of the economic aggre-
gates is also discussed. The reduction in the standard 
deviation of growth, or in other words, the amplitude 
of the cycle for most economic aggregates, is clearly dis-
cernible in the developed economies, especially since the 
mid 1980s, and has recently been the subject of much 
attention in the economic literature. However, it is hard 
to investigate precisely whether that lower volatility is due 
to random circumstances in the form of relatively small 
exogenous shocks, or to more efﬁ  cient to monetary and 
ﬁ  scal stabilisation policies or to a change in the economic 
structure (e.g. a shift in favour of the services sector, more 
efﬁ  cient stock management, or better access to ﬁ  nancial 
instruments).
Finally, this article examines the close connection between 
the cycles in the various economies, particularly that of 
the US and the euro area  : has globalisation of the real 
and ﬁ   nancial economy also led to greater synchronisa-
tion ? As well as offering a possible interpretation of these 
trends, the article also explores the policy implications.
1.   Economic theory and general 
equilibrium models
In recent decades, research on economic cycles has 
intensiﬁ  ed. Traditionally, the analysis of the business cycle 
was primarily statistical and descriptive, but the approach 
nowadays is far more theoretical.
The modern theory of the economic cycle assumes that 
the economic system is inherently stable. The cycles are 
generated by exogenous shocks, but after each shock 
the internal dynamics of the system will constantly tend 
to revert to the system’s equilibrium growth path. This 
approach is in line with current economic theory which 
assumes rational behaviour on the part of the individual 
economic agents  : households maximise their well-being 
and companies optimise shareholder value. In the process, 
both households and businesses form rational expecta-
tions regarding future changes in budget restrictions and 
technological constraints, which means that they use all 60
available information to predict future developments as 
accurately as possible. Within this theoretical framework, 
the individual decisions will be automatically coordinated 
by market pricing. The result is a stable economic model 
in which the cycles are driven by external shocks in regard 
to preferences, technological progress or government 
interventions.
This approach to the economic cycle is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the traditional, mainly Keynesian view of the 
economy. The traditional approach was more critical as 
regards the stability and dynamic efﬁ  ciency of the market 
economy. According to that approach, the uncoordinated 
behaviour of consumers and investors regularly disrupted 
the balance in the form of either under-consumption or 
excess accumulation of capital goods, triggering a reces-
sion. The cause of the cycles was therefore attributed to 
the internal dynamics of the market economy. However, 
this analysis remained mostly descriptive and lacked any 
genuine empirical testing of the underlying model. In the 
modern literature, this approach is viewed as a dissenting 
opinion which deviates somewhat from the mainstream 
models, with rational expectations and markets which are 
almost perfectly efﬁ  cient.
In the recent models, great progress has been made in 
combining theoretical insights with the empirical regulari-
ties. The general equilibrium models succeed in describing 
the rational decisions of the various economic agents in a 
consistent system of equations. That system explains the 
consumption behaviour and the labour supply of house-
holds as well as the investment, employment and pricing 
behaviour of businesses. It also describes the behaviour of 
the monetary and ﬁ  scal authorities via systematic rules. 
All those decisions are inﬂ  uenced by both past decisions 
– the “delayed” effects due to all kinds of adjustment 
costs or information lags – and expectations about future 
movements in exogenous and endogenous variables. Yet 
these systems are relatively easy to solve and can also be 
estimated empirically.
The Bank uses a general equilibrium model of this type 
as a research instrument for analysis and research on the 
economy and the optimum monetary policy (Smets and 
Wouters 2003). This article begins with a summary of 
the main ﬁ  ndings on the subject. The same model was 
estimated for the euro area and for the US. On the basis 
of this exercise, it is possible to identify and quantify the 
causes of the economic cycles in the two economies, in 
the form of the underlying exogenous shocks. Naturally, 
such an exercise is always based on a whole series of 
assumptions. Other models or model speciﬁ  cations may 
produce different conclusions regarding the role of the 
various shocks.
1.1   Theoretical assumptions underlying general 
equilibrium models
The main characteristics of these models can be summa-
rised as follows :
–   The goods and labour market are modelled as mar-
kets with imperfect or monopolistic competition. This 
means that the goods offered and labour performed 
are imperfect substitutes and that the parties offering 
them can to some extent determine their price them-
selves, in contrast to a perfect competition situation in 
which the price for the individual sellers is ﬁ  xed and 
is equal to the market price. In the case of imperfect 
competition, the price will therefore be determined as 
a mark-up on top of the marginal production costs. The 
size of the mark-up will depend on the price elasticity 
of demand  : if the elasticity is very large, i.e. if there is 
very little difference between the various goods, and 
variations in price give rise to large substitution effects, 
the mark-up will be very small. Greater differentiation 
or lower price elasticity, on the other hand, will lead 
to a larger mark-up. Obviously, positive mark-ups in 
prices and wages result in less economic activity than 
in a competitive economy with no mark-ups. In these 
models, the mark-up is an exogenously determined 
structural characteristic of the economy. The degree of 
monopolistic competition determines the equilibrium 
level of economic activity.
–   In these models, price and wage ﬁ  xing is also subject 
to nominal rigidity in one form or another. Prices and 
wages are not revised in each period to the optimum 
level in line with changes in costs or demand. In those 
circumstances, a rational price setter will take account 
of the fact that his price will remain unchanged for a 
number of periods. The price will then be determined 
as a mark-up on a weighted average of present and 
future marginal costs. The same will happen to wage 
ﬁ   xing. Empirical estimates based on macroeconomic 
data show that prices and wages are typically ﬁ  xed for 
relatively long periods.
–   Apart from some form of nominal rigidity, these 
models also feature real rigidities. These mechanisms 
explain in the ﬁ   rst instance why the various compo-
nents of demand respond only slowly to the various 
types of economic shocks. Consumption demand is 
characterised by habit formation households will be 
slow to adapt their consumption in line with a change 
in income level. Changes in the level of investment are 
typically associated with adjustment costs : if the proﬁ  t-
ability of the capital stock increases, businesses will only 
slowly step up their investments. This can be explained 
both by the simple fact that it takes time to carry out 
business investment, and by the argument that major 
investments also entail time-consuming additional 61
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training and implementation costs which may be at the 
expense of the existing activity.
–   Another mechanism causing some real rigidity is the 
variable use of the existing production capacity. This 
means that, if demand increases, production can 
increase without any signiﬁ  cant rise in marginal costs. 
In the short term, variations in the degree of existing 
capacity utilisation may inhibit the sensitivity of the 
marginal costs, and hence prices, to ﬂ  uctuations  in 
output.
–   Finally, the model is closed with a systematic behaviour 
response by the monetary and ﬁ  scal authorities. The 
monetary policy response typically takes the form of a 
reaction to inﬂ  ation – more speciﬁ  cally, the deviation 
between the inﬂ  ation rate and the central bank’s inﬂ  a-
tion target – and a reaction to the output gap. Later 
on, this article will examine in some detail the speciﬁ  c 
concept of the output gap used in these models.
–   One of the important weaknesses of the model used 
here is that the economies are seen as closed econo-
mies and the ﬁ  scal policy is not modelled as yet, or only 
in a very primitive way as an exogenous process with no 
response to developments elsewhere in the economy.
On the basis of these fairly simple theoretical insights, 
the behaviour of households and businesses is derived 
as totally rational, resulting in a mathematical system of 
equations. There are two features which typify the differ-
ence between these general equilibrium models and the 
traditional macroeconomic models :
–   In the modern general equilibrium models, both long-
term and short-term relationships between the differ-
ent economic variables are derived from optimising 
behaviour. This implies that the models are totally con-
sistent from a theoretical pont of view. Both demand 
and supply and price and wage formation are at all 
times fully coordinated and based on the same informa-
tion about current and future trends in the exogenous 
processes.
–   General equilibrium models are typically viewed as a 
system of equations that can be estimated simultane-
ously. This implies that the rational behaviour and the 
expectations regarding the future movement in the 
different variables are based on predictions consistent 
with the model.
An example may make this clear. When the total exog-
enous productivity of the factors of production increases, 
the supply of goods offered by businesses will increase 
while prices fall, but on the other hand the expected 
wealth of households will increase, bolstering con-
sumption and at the same time leading to higher wage 
demands. Such consistency between the response of the 
various sectors to an exogenous shock is not guaranteed 
in the traditional models which are built up sector by 
sector or equation by equation.
According to this same principle, all macroeconomic vari-
ables will respond systematically to the various exogenous 
shocks affecting the economy during the economic cycle. 
All variables will therefore supply information identifying 
the various shocks. By regarding the system of equations 
as a whole when estimating the model, one can make 
optimum use of all information available on the different 
variables. This “full-information” estimation procedure is 
theoretically a major advantage, but it also has its risks  : 
if particular sectors or equations are incorrectly speciﬁ  ed, 
this may distort all the results of the estimation.
The Bayesian estimation method may offer a solution 
here, as it is based on a “prior” assumption regarding the 
various parameters of the model. That prior information 
may originate from other estimation results in the litera-
ture, be based on data from other countries, other peri-
ods or other types of data, e.g. microeconomic studies. 
The more robust and accurate this prior information, the 
greater the weight that can be assigned to it in the esti-
mation procedure. The information in the economic time 
series on which the model estimation is based is then used 
to supplement the prior information and in that way to 
arrive at a “posterior” distribution for the various model 
parameters. In contrast to the classic estimation methods 
aimed at estimating the “real” parameters as efﬁ  ciently 
as possible, the Bayesian method aims at estimating the 
whole distribution and thus the probability of the various 
parameters. This estimation method therefore results in 
a full description of the parameter distribution, which is 
very useful for determining the margin of uncertainty in 
prediction exercises or all other deductions based on the 
model.
1.2   Empirical implementation of the general 
equilibrium models
This standard general equilibrium model was estimated 
for the US and for the euro area, taking seven macroeco-
nomic variables into account  : GDP, consumption, invest-
ment, employment, wages, inﬂ  ation in the price deﬂ  ator 
of GDP and the short-term interest rate. In this exercise, 
which intends to compare the two economies, the model 
was estimated for the two economies over the same 
base period  : 1974.1-2002.4. The estimation concerns 
both the behaviour parameters of households, ﬁ  rms and 
public authorities and the parameters which describe the 
exogenous processes : the variance and persistence of the 
exogenous shocks. Together, these parameters determine 
the entire behaviour of the economic system and make it 62
possible, for example, to ascribe the total variance of the 
system to the various underlying exogenous shocks.
Ten exogenous shocks were identiﬁ  ed in the course of 
the estimation. Six of them were modelled as persistent 
processes which typically have a fairly protracted inﬂ  uence 
on the economy :
–   shocks in the total factor productivity (TFP) of the 
economy ;
–   productivity shocks speciﬁ  c to capital goods ;
–   shocks in the labour supply of households  : these 
shocks speciﬁ  cally take the form of a more or less per-
sistent shift in the relative value placed on labour effort 
in the utility function of the households, so that the 
households are inclined to do more or less work at a 
particular wage rate. Changes in the participation rate, 
standard of education, etc. and institutional reforms on 
the labour market will also be covered by this shock in 
so far as they inﬂ  uence the economy primarily via the 
labour supply ;
–   shocks in the intertemporal preferences of households : 
such shocks typically lead to a temporary postpone-
ment of household spending but without any change 
in households’ overall budgets or wealth ;
–   shocks in exogenous demand and/or government 
spending ;
–   shocks in the monetary policy inﬂ  ation  target :  this 
shock determines the long-term level of inﬂ  ation and 
hence the nominal interest rate.
In addition, there are four shocks which were modelled as 
being relatively short-lived :
–   temporary changes in the mark-up for price-setting ;
–   temporary changes in the mark-up for wage-setting ;
–   temporary changes in the cost of ﬁ  nancing  invest-
ment ;
–   temporary changes in the interest rate : these are inter-
est rate changes which are not generated endogenously 
by the response of monetary authorities to ﬂ  uctuations 
in inﬂ  ation or output.
Each of these shocks has its speciﬁ  c inﬂ  uence on the seven 
macroeconomic variables used for the historical estima-
tion. The effect of the shocks on the economic system 
is typically reﬂ  ected in the impulse-response functions of 
the shock on the different variables. The impulse-response 
effects for some of the shocks are shown in chart 1.
An average positive shock affecting total factor productiv-
ity causes an increase in output and in the various com-
ponents of demand, while inﬂ  ation  falls.  Employment 
declines, primarily in the short term, since demand and 
production respond only slowly to the positive wealth 
effects of this shock. The short-term interest rate falls 
owing to the decline in inﬂ  ation, but also because – in 
the short term – output lags behind the expansion in pro-
duction capacity. Other supply shocks with comparable 
effects are the shock to the labour supply and the shock 
affecting the speciﬁ  c technology of capital goods.
A positive shock affecting the intertemporal preferences 
of households encourages the propensity to consume 
in the short term and is a typical example of a demand 
shock. Such a shock causes a rise in output and prices 
with an increase in the short-term interest rate, causing 
a crowding out in investment spending. Another demand 
shock is the shock affecting exogenous expenditure 
(e.g. in government spending) which has the effect of 
crowding out the two private demand components.
A shock affecting the price mark-up has a positive impact 
on inﬂ  ation in the short term but produces a negative 
wealth effect, causing a fall in demand and hence in 
output. Monetary policy responds relatively weakly to 
such a temporary surge in inﬂ  ation, since the curbing of 
short-term inﬂ  ation has to be weighed against the nega-
tive output gap. The impulse-response function of this 
shock shows a strong similarity with the effects of an oil 
price shock.
Finally, the impulse-response function for a monetary 
shock affecting the short-term interest rate is explained. 
An interest rate hike has negative repercussions on the 
demand components – and even more so on investment, 
which is relatively sensitive to interest rates – and also 
leads to a fall in inﬂ  ation, which is fairly persistent on 
account of price and wage rigidities.
Without going into the estimation results in detail, it must 
be said the results for the US are very similar to those for 
the euro area, both for the behaviour parameters of ﬁ  rms 
and households and the parameters which determine 
the systematic behaviour of monetary policy, and for the 
variance and persistence of the different structural shocks. 
The fact that the results for the systematic monetary 
policy of the two economies are comparable is particularly 
surprising since there was no single European monetary 
policy during the period considered, and the estimations 
were therefore based on a highly abstract representation 
of the real situation. Yet the congruity of the results for 
the two economies is not so surprising in view of the 
other results in the literature, which also indicate a close 
similarity. On the basis of a descriptive comparison of the 
economic cycle in the euro area and the US, Mojon and 
Agresti (2001) also deduced that the cyclical behaviour of 
the two economies was very similar : the variance and the 
correlation of a whole series of macroeconomic variables 
tally very closely. Studies focusing on speciﬁ  c behavioural 63
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CHART 1A  IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR A SHOCK AFFECTING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
  (Deviation relative to base, in percentage points)


























































































































CHART 1B  IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR A SHOCK AFFECTING CONSUMPTION PREFERENCES
  (Deviation relative to base, in percentage points) 


























































































































CHART 1C  IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR A SHOCK AFFECTING THE PRICE MARK-UP 
  (Deviation relative to base, in percentage points) 


































































































































CHART 1D  IMPULSE-RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR A MONETARY SHOCK AFFECTING THE SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE
  (Deviation relative to base, in percentage points)
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relationships also frequently produce very comparable 
estimation results for the two economies  : for instance, 
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali et. al. (2001) estimate 
the same nominal rigidity for price-ﬁ  xing in the US and in 
the euro area. Our estimation results relating to nominal 
rigidities also tally closely with those results.
2.   Decomposing the business cycle into 
the underlying shocks
The cycle or, in other words, the volatility of the econo-
mies considered, can be decomposed in two ways. First, 
it is possible to arrive at an average split of the cycli-
cal volatility of each of the variables considered. Here, 
“average” means the average contributions made by the 
shocks over the period considered, namely 1974-2002. 
This exercise can be performed for various prediction 
horizons  : what is the expected average variation of 
output, employment, inﬂ  ation or the interest rate in a 
prediction exercise over one quarter, four quarters, ten 
quarters or thirty quarters. For each of these horizons, 
the variance recorded in the variables can be broken 
down into the various shocks, revealing the extent to 
which the shocks have contributed to the expected aver-
age variance of the variables over that horizon. Since 
thirty quarters – or about eight years – corresponds to 
the average length of the cycle, a breakdown over that 
horizon will indicate which shocks determine the long-
term economic picture.
A second way of effecting the decomposition is to con-
sider the values recorded for the different variables during 
speciﬁ  c observation periods and ascribe them to the his-
torically speciﬁ  c shocks which gave rise to them. Such an 
exercise may give some idea, for example, of the shocks 
which have occurred during the last four recession periods 
(1974-1975, 1981-1982, 1990-1992-1993, 2000-2002) 
or during the intervening economic expansion phases.
2.1   Average decomposition of the cycle in the euro 
area and in the US
If we consider the decomposition of output, measured 
on the basis of GDP, then it is apparent that the volatility 
or variance of output over a short prediction horizon of 
between one quarter and one year is determined mainly 
by the various demand shocks (Chart 2). Shocks in gov-
ernment spending or in other exogenous components of 
demand, preference shocks in consumption or monetary 
stimuli are dominant here  ; they determine over half of 
the total variance in the output of the euro area and more 
than 70 p.c. of the variance in US output. However, the 
inﬂ  uence of these shocks is short-lived and over a longer 
horizon it is the “supply” shocks that are dominant. Here, 
supply shocks means mainly TFP shocks and labour supply 
shocks. Over a 10-quarter horizon, these two shocks 
account for roughly 70 and 50 p.c. of the variance in the 
euro area and the US respectively. Over an eight-year hori-
zon, those ﬁ  gures increase to 87 and 74 p.c. This decom-
position of the trend in output ties in closely with other 
results in the literature. A SVAR model for the US-based 
study by Shapiro and Watson (1988) also showed that, 
taken over a longer horizon, shocks in the labour supply 
and productivity are the predominant factors dictating 
the pattern of the cycle, while demand shocks are more 
important in the short term.
In consumption, too, the supply shocks mentioned above 
(TFP shocks and labour supply shocks) appear to be the 
main driving force behind the long-term trend. Demand 
shocks once again play a key role in short-term consump-
tion trends. Here it is the shock of intertemporal prefer-
ences – i.e. exogenous changes in consumer spending 
patterns, causing people to postpone or accelerate their 
consumption – that predominates. Monetary policy also 
inﬂ   uences consumption over shorter horizons, precisely 
because it has an impact, via the interest rate, on the con-
sumer’s intertemporal decisions. The importance of these 
two demand shocks for short-term consumption trends is 
evidently rather greater in the US than in the euro area.
Apart from the two supply shocks which affect GDP 
and consumption (namely TFP shocks and labour supply 
shocks), the long-term investment trend is also inﬂ  u-
enced by the productivity shock speciﬁ  c to capital goods. 
Together with the more volatile shock in the cost of 
ﬁ   nancing investments, this more persistent shock also 
largely explains the short-term volatility of investment.
As regards the movement in real wages, the shock in the 
wage mark-up plays a key role in the short term. This con-
cerns short-term variations in the inﬂ  uence of labour as a 
production factor on wage-setting. The labour supply has 
hardly any inﬂ  uence on real wages. In the long term, the 
TFP shock is the principal fundamental economic deter-
minant of wages. Technological progress is thus reﬂ  ected 
in an increase in production together with an increase in 
purchasing power, generating the demand to absorb the 
greater production capacity.
The labour supply is the only important factor in the long-
term employment picture. In contrast, the productivity 
shock plays little if any part in employment in the long 
term. On the other hand, the short-term employment 
trend is greatly inﬂ  uenced by the TFP shock, as well as by 
the demand shocks which also affect output.66
Overall, it is evident that the monetary policy shock plays 
only a relatively minor role in the decomposition of the 
real variables. However, this must not be interpreted as 
meaning that monetary policy is unimportant for what 
actually happens in the economy. The inﬂ  uence of the 
various shocks on the real decisions is largely determined 
by the central bank’s systematic policy. A typical example 





































CHART 2  DECOMPOSITION OF OUTPUT AND DEMAND COMPONENTS IN THE EURO AREA AND IN THE UNITED STATES (1)
  (Percentage contributions of the various shocks to the variance)
(1)  The decomposition of the average variance of the prediction error for an horizon of between 1 quarter and 30 quarters, calculated on the basis of the estimated models.
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expansionary effect of a productivity shock depends very 
much on how accommodating monetary policy is in its 
response to such a shock. If the nominal interest rate 
remains unchanged in the event of an exogenous posi-
tive shock in productivity, the real interest rate will rise as 
a result of the fall in marginal costs, prices and inﬂ  ation 
expectations. Such an increase in the real interest rate will 
have a negative inﬂ  uence on the demand components 
which may largely offset the positive wealth effect of the 
shock. In that situation, employment will contract and the 
negative pressure on costs and prices will consequently 
be further exacerbated. Given such a restrictive monetary 
response to productivity shocks, demand and output will 
show only a modest increase while employment will con-
tract. Under those circumstances, one can hardly expect 
the productivity shocks to provide the main explanation 
for the cycles, as a key feature of the economic cycle is 
that output and employment show a positive correlation 
throughout the cycle. A productivity shock has a totally 
different effect in the case of a highly accommodating 
monetary policy that supports demand as much as possi-
ble in order to take advantage of the increased production 
capacity of the economy. Such a response by monetary 
policy is more probable if, on the one hand, the interest 
rate systematically produces a sharper response to inﬂ  a-
tion and if, on the other hand, the output gap – to which 
monetary policy may respond – is correctly estimated, 
which means that the estimated production potential and 
hence the output target is in fact adjusted upwards as a 
result of increased productivity.
However, monetary policy plays a far more visible role 
in the nominal course of the economy. Thus, monetary 
policy – certainly in Europe – is by far the most important 
determinant of inﬂ  ation in the long term. A shock in the 
inﬂ  ation target plays a particularly important role. That 
also explains the importance of announcing an explicit 
inﬂ  ation target which, if credible, forms an anchor point 
for inﬂ  ation expectations and thus becomes an important 

























CHART 3  DECOMPOSITION OF REAL WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE EURO AREA AND IN THE UNITED STATES 
  (Percentage contributions of the various shocks to the variance)
EURO AREA UNITED STATES
Total factor productivity
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DECOMPOSITION OF REAL WAGES




inﬂ  ation is determined to a large degree by what is called 
the mark-up shock which – by deﬁ  nition – is exogenous 
so that the monetary authority has no control over it. For 
the intermediate horizons (4 and particularly 10 quarters), 
monetary policy gradually acquires more control over 
inﬂ  ation. That also explains why the deﬁ  nition of price 
stability applicable to the Eurosystem is explicitly geared 
to the medium term.
The upward trend in inﬂ  ation during the 1970s and the 
downward trend since the early 1980s are thus largely 
attributed to changes in the systematic behaviour of the 
central bank and more particularly to the inﬂ  ation target 
applied. In the model, such systematic disinﬂ  ation  is 
indeed associated with a fairly modest inﬂ  uence on the 
real economy. The model may perhaps underestimate 
the “sacriﬁ   ce ratio” of such disinﬂ  ation,  because  the 
estimation implicitly assumes that all economic agents 
immediately adjust their inﬂ   ation expectations in line 
with the modiﬁ  ed monetary policy. Presumably this takes 
much longer to happen in reality, and only results from 
the negative output and employment effects which such 
a tightening of policy entails in the short term.
The inﬂ  ation target shock also plays an essential role in 
the other nominal variable, namely the short-term interest 
rate. In the euro area, the inﬂ  ation target is manifestly the 
main factor determining the long-term trend in the short-
term interest rate. In addition, the monetary policy shock 
itself is a driving force behind short-term interest rates, and 
in the United States the same holds true for intermediate 
and even long-term horizons. The monetary policy shock 
must therefore be interpreted as an exogenous deviation 
in the interest movements generated (endogenously) by 
the reaction function of the monetary authorities. The 
reaction function comprises the systematic component 
of monetary policy, whereas the monetary policy shock 
reﬂ  ects the discretionary component, e.g. if the monetary 
policy response to the output gap, or to an inﬂ  ation level 

























CHART 4  DECOMPOSITION OF INFLATION AND THE SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE IN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES
  (Percentage contributions of the various shocks to the variance)
EURO AREA UNITED STATES
1 quarter 4 quarters 10 quarters 30 quarters
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DECOMPOSITION OF THE SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE
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than usual, or if monetary policy reacts to economic devel-
opments which are not modelled in the reaction function. 
The fact that, for all horizons considered, the monetary 
policy shock is greater in the United States than in the 
euro area indicates that monetary policy there has been 
conducted less systematically in the past.
2.2   Decomposition of output during speciﬁ  c periods 
of recession and economic expansion
The analysis of the speciﬁ   c periods of expansion and 
recession in terms of underlying shocks is more informa-
tive than their average decomposition. In this respect, 
it is necessary to draw attention to the diversity of the 
shocks which occurred during the four recession periods 
  considered, even though the shocks affecting demand 
generally played a very important role. Table 1 contains 
the estimates, based on the general equilibrium models, 
of the contribution of the various types of shocks to the 
growth of GDP in the euro area and in the United States 
during those speciﬁ   c periods. The table presents the 
contributions which the various shocks made to growth 
during certain sub-periods.
During the 1974-1975 recession, a series of negative 
shocks affected the determinants of investment and 
the intertemporal preferences underlying consumption 
expenditure (in the United States only). In the euro area, 
a signiﬁ  cant fall in exogenous demand was also recorded, 
probably as a result of the decline in world trade following 
the oil shock. The increased price mark-up, probably also 
TABLE 1 DECOMPOSITION OF GDP DURING SPECIFIC PERIODS OF RECESSION AND EXPANSION
(Percentage contributions to the growth of GDP during the period in question)
Decomposition of the four recessions in the euro area and in the US
Euro area US Euro area US Euro area US Euro area US
74:1 – 75:1 80:1 – 82:4 92:1 – 93:2 90:1 – 91:4 00:2 – 02:2
TFP shock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.27 –0.57 –0.27 –0.38 1.08 0.96 –2.79 2.49
Labour supply shock  . . . . . . . . . –1.66 –1.45 0.65 –1.06 –0.74 –0.42 2.44 0.11
Investment shock   . . . . . . . . . . . –1.04 –0.98 1.61 0.42 –1.59 –2.20 –0.90 –2.64
Intertemp. pref. shock . . . . . . . . 0.12 –1.33 –1.71 0.01 –1.29 –1.76 –0.15 –1.68
Exog. spending shock  . . . . . . . . –1.59 –0.38 0.33 –0.66 0.68 0.72 0.89 0.17
Monetary policy shock   . . . . . . . 1.28 0.02 –3.02 –5.16 –0.77 0.06 1.00 –0.47
Iinflation target shock  . . . . . . . . –0.05 0.00 0.07 –0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 –0.01
Financing shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.47 –0.33 –0.27 –0.42 –0.46 –0.47 –0.31 –0.39
Price mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . . –0.37 –1.07 0.13 –0.72 0.21 –1.09 –0.10 0.93
Wage mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . 0.03 0.07 0.00 –0.25 –0.12 0.36 0.06 –1.06
Decomposition of the three  expansion periods in the euro area and in the US
Euro area US Euro area US Euro area US
75:1 – 80:1 82:4 – 92:1 82:4 – 90:1 95:1 – 00:2
TFP shock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.87 –1.72 4.96 –2.03 0.60 1.34
Labour supply shock  . . . . . . . . . –0.42 0.49 9.53 11.05 7.33 1.52
Investment shock   . . . . . . . . . . . 2.26 3.61 2.57 –2.15 –2.33 1.31
Intertemp. pref. shock . . . . . . . . 2.76 2.67 0.08 0.46 1.58 1.17
Exog. spending shock  . . . . . . . . 1.15 –0.91 –0.06 2.47 –0.28 –0.18
Monetary policy shock   . . . . . . . 1.53 –0.68 –1.73 1.66 1.10 1.21
Inflation target shock   . . . . . . . . –0.03 –0.08 0.01 –0.06 –0.03 –0.04
Financing shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.42 0.90 0.42 0.29 –0.11 0.07
Price mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . . 0.55 1.41 –0.03 0.82 –0.31 0.78
Wage mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . –0.36 –0.39 0.30 0.63 0.14 1.1170
due to the oil shocks, had a negative impact on output, 
especially in the United States. Moreover, a negative shock 
affecting the labour supply led to increased pressure on 
labour costs and exerted a negative inﬂ  uence on activity 
in both economies. That shock could also be linked with 
the oil shock, which caused labour costs to rise owing to 
wage rigidity.
In both Europe and the United States, the 1980-1982 
recession was determined to a large extent by the reversal 
of monetary policy. As pointed out earlier, a perfectly 
credible change to the inﬂ   ation targets in the context 
of monetary policy has only a minor negative effect on 
output. That is why the model ﬁ  rst considers the tight-
ening of monetary policy applied in the early 1980s as 
a series of short-term changes in interest rates. Such 
interest rate shocks have a greater negative impact on 
demand. The change in monetary policy is only gradu-
ally reﬂ  ected in a permanent shift in the inﬂ  ation target. 
That interpretation of the recession in the US in the early 
1980s conforms overall to the one given in the literature 
concerning the turn of on the monetary policy pursued by 
the Federal Reserve System while Paul Volcker was chair-
man, following the more accommodating stance which 
had characterised the 1970s. In Europe, too, those years 
coincided with the ﬁ  rst phase of adjustment on the road 
to greater monetary stability within the EMS. The long 
period of negative real interest rates in the 1970s was 
thus succeeded by a period of high real interest rates in 
the 1980s.
The fact that the recession which occurred in the early 
1990s was not synchronous between the US and the euro 
area was due mainly to German reuniﬁ  cation. Despite the 
different timing, the two recessions were caused mainly 
by the shocks affecting the propensity to consume and 
invest. Although it is debatable whether the shock affect-
ing investment is a demand shock or a supply shock, the 
decline in demand during that period seems to have been 
considerable (the temporary rise in the cost of ﬁ  nancing 
investment is another reason for that recession).
The latest recession in the US presents exactly the same 
proﬁ   le. For the euro area, the situation is less clear. 
Although a number of negative shocks affecting demand 
did occur in mid 2001, inﬂ  uencing consumption, invest-
ment and exogenous or public spending, their overall 
impact during the period in question was relatively neu-
tral. However, what is striking is the large difference in the 
contribution of productivity to economic growth in the 
euro area and in the US during this recent period  : while 
the increase in productivity made a positive contribution 
to economic activity in the US, in the euro area the con-
tribution of productivity appears to have been decidedly 
negative. The latest recession therefore did show a differ-
ent proﬁ  le in the two economies.
It is also noticeable that the exogenous demand shock 
during each of the recession periods considered did not 
make any really negative contribution to growth. Since, 
in a closed economic model, this is the only channel 
through which external demand can inﬂ  uence the econ-
omy, that may well mean that the traditional channel for 
the transmission of a decline in economic activity via the 
trade ﬂ  ows did not play a crucial role during these reces-
sions. It is more a question of general shocks which had 
a more or less simultaneous negative impact on activity. 
However, the speciﬁ  c character of those general shocks 
varied over time  : oil prices and the labour supply during 
the 1974-1975 recession, monetary policy in 1980-1982, 
asynchronous demand shocks in the early 1990s. It is only 
the demand shocks affecting consumption and the nega-
tive investment shocks that apparently recurred during the 
various recessions.
As already stated, the longer periods of economic recov-
ery are supported mainly by positive developments con-
cerning productivity and the labour market. The fact that 
the euro area in the 1970s and 1980s featured strong 
growth of productivity may be attributable largely to the 
radical sectoral restructuring during that period. In the 
1980s and – for the euro area – during the whole of the 
last decade of the 20th  century, there were signiﬁ  cant 
positive developments affecting labour supply. During 
the expansion period of the 1980s, the growth of real 
wages remained relatively modest, despite the strong 
expansion in employment and consumption. The model 
therefore interprets that as an exogenous increase in the 
labour supply affecting the trend in wages and consump-
tion. It should be noted that, for the US, all variables are 
expressed per capita (population over the age of 16), 
so that ﬂ  uctuations in immigration should not have any 
direct effect on the results.
2.3   The output gap concept in these general 
equilibrium models
Unlike the traditional Keynesian view on recession peri-
ods, general equilibrium models do not necessarily see a 
recession as an undertilisation of capacity and a period of 
negative output gap, because in these models the produc-
tion potential is determined by the whole of the structural 
or fundamental shocks to which households and ﬁ  rms 
react in a totally rational and efﬁ  cient way.71
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The output gap concept in these models is typically cal-
culated as the difference in output that results from the 
fundamental shocks in technology and preferences in the 
model “with” nominal rigidities on the one hand, and in 
the model “without” nominal rigidities on the other. In 
the model, the nominal rigidities form the main reason 
why the economic agents do not adapt their real decisions 
immediately to the altered circumstances. The difference 
between the outcome in the economy “with” and “with-
out” nominal rigidities therefore reﬂ  ects the inefﬁ  ciency 
of the economy. An economic policy and in particular a 





















































































































































































CHART 5A  THE NATURAL OUTPUT GAP AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE EURO AREA
  (Deviation from a linear trend, in percentage points)
Historical output Total factor productivity Labour supply
Historical output Natural output
Natural output gap





























































































































































CHART 5B  THE NATURAL OUTPUT GAP AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
  (Deviation from the linear trend, in percentage points)
Historical output Total factor productivity Labour supply
Historical output Natural output
Natural output gap
Historical output Intertemporal preferences Exogenous spending Investment productivity73
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and wages, will therefore lead to a smaller output gap 
and to more efﬁ  cient adjustment of the economy to the 
underlying fundamental shocks. In the charts, the output 
gap is estimated for the two economies  : the top two 
charts show the contributions to potential output made 
by persistent fundamental shocks. The third chart shows 
the actual output and the natural or efﬁ  cient output (cal-
culated as the sum of the contributions of the various 
fundamental shocks), with a linear trend growth removed 
from both series. Finally, the fourth chart shows the natu-
ral output gap.
In these models, recession periods therefore do not nec-
essarily coincide with negative output gaps, since the 
underlying shocks may also cause a sharp reduction in 
production potential. The natural output in the model 
does indeed decline sharply during each recession period, 
which explains why recessions do not automatically coin-
cide with periods of weaker inﬂ  ationary  pressure.  This 
concept of the output gap therefore largely avoids the 
potential conﬂ  ict between the two monetary policy objec-
tives, namely stable inﬂ  ation and a stable output gap.
2.4   Predictions based on the model for the euro 
area
The model can generate a prediction on the basis of 
the interpretation of recent economic developments. 
By way of example, chart 7  shows the results of such 
a prediction exercise together with the outcome of the 
macroeconomic projection produced by the Eurosystem 
(Broad Macroeconomic Projection Exercise – BMPE). The 
prediction runs from the last quarter of 2003 through 
2004 and 2005. While the BMPE indicates only the 
central scenario on the assumption that the short-term 
interest rate remains constant (the continuous line in the 
charts), the model offers not only a central prediction but 
also a margin of uncertainty for that prediction (dotted 
lines for the 5 p.c. and 25 p.c. upper and lower bounds). 
Moreover, the model prediction can also be based on an 








































































































CHART 6  PREDICTION BASED ON THE MODEL FOR THE EURO AREA COMPARED WITH THE BMPE PREDICTION FOR 2004-2005 (1) (2)
Source : ECB Monthly Bulletin, December 2003, and own calculations
(1)  The blue (yellow) dotted lines indicate the 25% (5%) upper and lower bounds of the predictions.
(2)  Compared to the fourth quarter of 2003 (base = 100).
(3)  Percentage change compared to the preceding quarter (on an annual basis).










BMPE inflation  (4)
Model inflation (4)




The central model prediction is very similar to the BMPE 
prediction for the components of demand, GDP and 
employment. The model produces a slightly lower esti-
mate than the BMPE for the movement in real wages 
and inﬂ  ation during 2005. According to the model, the 
short-term interest rate will gradually move back up to its 
historical average level.
Chart 7 below repeats the prediction for an interest rate 
scenario in which the interest rate does not begin to rise 
until the second half of 2004. These additional negative 
interest rate shocks lead to more buoyant demand and 
increased output in the second half of 2004 and 2005. 
According to this scenario, inﬂ  ation will therefore acceler-
ate during 2005. In the second half of 2004, the interest 
rate rises more steeply to its normal level as a result of the 
more dynamic economic activity and less favourable inﬂ  a-
tion outcomes. According to this interest rate scenario, 
growth will speed up slightly during 2004, though the 
effect is offset by a decleration in 2005.
The margins of uncertainty around the central prediction 
are due to two components  : the uncertainty concerning 
the model parameters and that concerning the future 
occurrence of the exogenous shocks. The uncertainty 
is generated mainly by the possible future shocks in 
the exogenous processes for technology, preferences 
and government intervention. In order to estimate that 
uncertainty, the model simulation is supplemented with 
stochastic shocks which, in terms of their average size, 
correspond to the estimated standard deviations. The 
margins of uncertainty are then calculated as the high-
est and lowest 5 p.c. and 25 p.c. of the predictions for 
a large number of simulations. These margins can also 
be used to calculate the probability of certain scenarios. 
Monetary policy makers attach great importance to risk 
scenarios in which inﬂ  ation is too high (risk of inﬂ  ation 
running at over the 2 p.c. target during the ensuing year) 
or in which there is a risk of deﬂ  ation (risk of inﬂ  ation 
averaging less than zero during the ensuing year). The 
difference between the two, namely the risk of rising 
inﬂ  ation and the risk of deﬂ  ation, is called the balance 
of risks. These risks were calculated on the basis of the 
predictions formulated quarterly since 1999 and are then 
combined in a chart. The balance of risks equalled zero for 
the ﬁ  rst time during 1999, a period that coincided with 
the uncertainty about the impact on the real economy of 
the ﬁ  nancial crises which occurred during 1998. In 2002 
the risk balance became negative  : during that period, 




































































































CHART 7  PREDICTION BASED ON THE MODEL FOR THE EURO AREA WITH THE SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE CONSTANT FOR THE 
FIRST HALF OF 2004, COMPARED TO THE BMPE PREDICTION FOR 2004-2005 (1) (2)
Source : ECB Monthly Bulletin, December 2003, and own calculations.
(1)  The blue (yellow) dotted lines indicate the 25% (5%) upper and lower bounds of the predictions. 
(2)  Compared to the fourth quarter of 2003 (base = 100).
(3)  Percentage change compared to the preceding quarter (on an annual basis).
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  inﬂ  ation. These relatively low inﬂ  ation predictions reﬂ  ect 
the impact of the sluggish growth on inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions. In the course of 2003, the equilibrium in the inﬂ  a-
tion risk was restored.
Risk analyses like these can provide additional information 
which cannot be deduced directly from the traditional 
central prediction results. For the policy makers, during 
periods of increased, uncertainty, they can offer an idea 
of the risks of certain extreme outcomes. Policy cannot be 
geared to the optimum outcome according to the average 
scenario alone, but must also endeavour to avoid extreme 
situations as far as possible. That type of consideration is 
attracting increasing attention in the central bank termi-
nology. Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board (2003), recently therefore described monetary 
policy as a risk management exercise, since the economic 
environment is changing faster and becoming harder to 
predict than before.













CHART 8  RISK ANALYSIS BASED ON THE MODEL 
PREDICTIONS





















































































































































































































CHART 9  DECLINE IN THE VOLATILITY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
  (Percentage growth of GDP, quarter on quarter)
EURO AREA
UNITED STATES76
3.   Decline in the volatility of economic 
growth in recent decades
During the past thirty years, economic activity has become 
less volatile. From 1984 to the present day, the variance 
in GDP growth (quarter on quarter) in both the euro area 
and the US has more than halved compared to the period 
1960-1983. That lower volatility is reﬂ  ected very generally 
in a range of macroeconomic aggregates and economic 
sectors, but also in various countries. However, this trend 
does differ from sector to sector and from country to 
country  : in the US, for example, a sudden break clearly 
occurred in 1984. In a recent report on structural shifts 
within the European economy (5th Structural Issues 
Report, MPC 2003), the ECB also discusses this trend in 
detail. According to some sources, volatility has actually 
declined more sharply in Europe than in the US.
Table 2 offers a summary of this trend in volatility for the 
various aggregates in both economies.
There are three main theories put forward to explain this 
increased stability in economic growth, and they can be 
veriﬁ   ed on the basis of simulations using the general 
equilibrium model.
TABLE 2 DOWNWARD TREND IN THE VOLATILITY OF THE REAL ECONOMY
Variance of real growth in the euro area Variance of real growth in the US
1960-2003 1960-1983 1984-2003 1960-2003 1960-1983 1984-2003
GDP growth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.77 1.16 0.29 0.61 0.80 0.25
1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003 1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003
GDP growth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.35 0.47 0.29 0.73 1.53 0.30
Consumption growth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.30 0.35 0.28 0.50 0.90 0.27
Investment growth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.07 2.11 1.94 5.42 10.51 2.94
Employment growth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.09 0.47 0.10 0.51 0.97 0.28
Growth of real wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.29 0.38 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.36
Change in inflation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.05
Change in short-term interest rate  . . . . 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.20 0.02
3.1 A more efﬁ  cient monetary policy
A ﬁ  rst theory is that the real stability is a by-product of 
greater nominal stability or more stable inﬂ  ation due to a 
more efﬁ  cient monetary policy. This debate focuses mainly 
on monetary policy because there are clear signs of a 
change in that policy, e.g. in terms of inﬂ  ation stability.
However, a more efﬁ  cient monetary policy will not neces-
sarily result in greater real stability. The effect produced 
by monetary policy on both real and nominal volatility is 
summarised in chart 10. The two monetary policy objec-
tives, namely output volatility (σγ) and inﬂ  ation volatility 








CHART 10  POTENTIAL IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY ON 
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in the exogenous shocks and a particular economic struc-
ture, an efﬁ  cient monetary policy will have an “efﬁ  ciency 
frontier” shown by the curve DCB. Each of the points on 
that curve indicates the outcome of an efﬁ  cient policy, 
but for different central bank preferences as regards the 
relative importance attached to inﬂ  ation  stability  and 
output stability respectively. In contrast, under these 
conditions point A indicates a monetary policy that does 
not produce the optimum response to the various shocks. 
Many writers have described the experience of the 1970s, 
when inﬂ  ation was accelerating, as the result of such an 
inefﬁ  cient policy that produces too weak a response to 
inﬂ  ationary pressure. On the assumption that monetary 
policy in the 1970s was not implemented efﬁ  ciently and 
was therefore typically at point A, a more efﬁ  cient policy 
can cause a shift to each of the three points D, C or B. 
Furthermore, if the shocks become smaller or if the eco-
nomic structure evolves towards a more stable economy, 
the whole “frontier” will move farther out, making result 
E achievable.
The general equilibrium model can be used to investigate 
which of the three movements – AD, AC or AB – is the 
most likely outcome of a more efﬁ  cient monetary policy. 
The impact of various monetary policy rules on the combi-
nation of real/nominal volatility can then be examined for 
a particular size of exogenous shocks. Stock and Watson 
(2003) duly carried out this exercise on the basis of four 
macroeconomic models (including our models for the US 
and the euro area). A switch from a relatively accommo-
dating monetary policy towards a stricter anti-inﬂ  ation 
policy always produced an internal movement that was 
closer to the shift AC (or even AD) than to the shift AB. In 
other words, σπ (inﬂ  ation volatility) becomes smaller, but 
that does not necessarily hold true for σγ (output volatil-
ity). A more efﬁ  cient monetary policy therefore did indeed 
contribute towards greater real stability in the economy, 
but that is not a sufﬁ  cient explanation in itself.
3.2     Shifts or changes in the economic structure
In this context, three different structural changes in the 
economy are often mentioned.
First, there is the long-term shift in the sectoral produc-
tion structure away from industry in favour of the services 
sector. In this context, it is pointed out that the more vola-
tile sectors – e.g., those which produce durable goods – are 
becoming smaller in relative terms in favour of services sec-
tors, which are more stable. A simple exercise in which the 
sectoral production structure is kept constant both before 
and after the mid 1980s but retaining the sectoral growth 
which occurred during the more recent period shows that 
this shift made only a small contribution to the increased 
stability.(1)  Furthermore, these sectoral shifts are typical 
long-term phenomena which can hardly explain a sudden 
break in volatility, such as that seen in the US.
A second explanation for the increased stability is based 
on the hypothesis that ﬁ  rms are managing their stocks 
more efﬁ  ciently, perhaps with the aid of increasing com-
puterisation and better communication facilities, so that the 
same ﬂ  uctuations in demand now make output less vola-
tile. Two ﬁ  ndings support this assertion  : output volatility is 
indeed falling more sharply than volatility in sales, especially 
in the highly cyclical sectors. In addition, before the mid 
1980s stocks tended to make a pro-cyclical contribution in 
the sectors producing durable goods, whereas more recently 
stocks have tended to follow an a-cyclical pattern. However, 
more detailed studies at both sectoral and macroeconomic 
level have shown that, although it is important at the level 
of the individual ﬁ  rm, more efﬁ  cient stock management 
cannot make a signiﬁ  cant contribution towards maintain-
ing more stable output during the economic cycle.
Finally, there is the hypothesis that ﬁ  nancial deregu-
lation  has increased the probability of a more stable 
development in demand. Both the development of inter-
est-bearing liquid assets and easier access to all kinds of 
credit should enable households to increase the stabil-
ity of their spending over time, making it more closely 
aligned with their permanent income and less dependent 
on temporary shocks affecting current income. The main 
argument in favour of this is the greater stability in the US 
housing construction sector. On the other hand, house-
hold consumption in the US has become less stable, if 
anything, over the period considered.
3.3   Random decline in the variance of the 
fundamental shocks
Since the above hypotheses do not jointly offer any really 
convincing explanation for the increased stability, the only 
remaining possibility is that the world economy has been 
spared any serious exogenous shocks over the past twenty 
years. That implies that the reduced volatility cannot be 
guaranteed in the future.
Although our model estimations are based on the 
assumption that the volatility of the shocks remained con-
stant over the entire period considered (1974-2003), the 
shocks which actually occurred can nevertheless provide 
(1)  The 5th Structural Issues Report (MPC 2003) also arrives at the same conclusion 
for the euro area.78
an indication of whether shocks were indeed smaller in 
the more recent period. Quite a few of the shocks identi-
ﬁ  ed in the model do in fact present a variance which is 
declining over time. The table shows that the variance 
of the shocks in the euro area has fallen most sharply in 
the case of total factor productivity, exogenous demand 
shocks, the cost of ﬁ  nancing investment and price mark-
up shocks. In the US, too, the variance declined in the 
case of exogenous demand shocks, ﬁ  nancing costs and 
price mark-up shocks, but it was also lower in interest 
rate shocks and intertemporal preferences regarding con-
sumption. Hardly any of the shocks presented an increase 
in variance between the two periods.
The conclusion is that probably half of the decline in the 
recorded volatility is due to the absence of major shocks. 
Adjustments in the economy may perhaps account for a 
quarter to a half at most. In addition, the more efﬁ  cient 
monetary policy has also contributed towards the real 
stability of economic growth. Being geared more towards 
stability, the monetary policy has also led to a more stable 
nominal inﬂ  ation and interest rate, which in the long term 
may indirectly reduce uncertainty and thus create the 
framework for stable and sustained economic growth.
4.   Synchronisation of the international 
business cycle and globalisation
Most studies unequivocally indicate a close connec-
tion between the business cycles of the various large 
economies, so that a global cycle clearly exists. This close 
link between the cycles in the various economic blocs is 
evident both from the chart showing the movement in 
GDP and from a simple yardstick such as the correlation 
between the various economies in terms of GDP growth.
This correlation is usually stronger for the growth of 
output (measured by GDP) and investment than for con-
sumption growth. The latter is still affected by country-
speciﬁ   c shocks, indicating that household incomes are 
still heavily dependent on domestic activity with little 
international diversiﬁ  cation. The international correlation 
also appears to be stronger during periods of recession 
than during periods of economic revival, which are often 
slower and less synchronised. One possible interpretation 
is that recessions are generated mainly by global shocks 
while their duration and the recovery tend to be more 
dependent on the speciﬁ  c structure and policy response 
of each individual country.
Has the globalisation of the economy in the form of 
increasing trade and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows led to greater syn-
chronisation in recent times  ? No theoretical or empiri-
cal evidence has yet been offered for that assertion. In 
theory, the increased integration of the economies could 
lead to greater specialisation, with countries or regions 
potentially becoming more sensitive to sectoral shocks. 
Increased integration and diversiﬁ  cation of the resources 
should nevertheless lead to a closer correlation in terms of 
consumption, but not necessarily as regards output.
Various empirical studies show that there has been no 
particular increase in this international correlation in 
economic activity during the recent period. The asym-
metric shocks triggered by German reuniﬁ  cation and the 
economic malaise in Japan tended to reduce rather than 
increase synchronisation during the 1990s.
TABLE 3 DOWNWARD TREND IN THE VOLATILITY OF THE ESTIMATED SHOCKS
Variance of the shocks in the euro area Variance of the shocks in the US
1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003 1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003
TFP shock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.29 0.42 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.18
Labour supply shock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.63 1.61 1.51 0.81 1.39 0.47
Investment shock   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01
Intertemp. pref. shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.72 3.17 1.02
Exog. spending shock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.29 0.51 0.18
Monetary policy shock   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.02
Inflation target shock   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financing shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22 0.28 0.19 0.31 0.63 0.15
Price mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02
Wage mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.0979
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Our models were estimated separately for the two econo-
mies, and the two blocs are regarded as closed economies. 
That is not exactly the best way of studying the question 
of synchronisation and spill-over effects. In our models, 
the correlation in the business cycle can only originate 
from the correlation between the various types of shocks 
in the two separately estimated models. The correlation 
between the various shocks over the period as a whole 
is not particularly high  : the only signiﬁ  cant correlation is 
between monetary policy shocks measured on the basis 
of temporary interest rate shocks. If the two sub-periods 
are considered separately, then a clearly higher correla-
tion becomes apparent between the shocks for the ﬁ  rst 
period, 1974-1984. The correlation during the ﬁ  rst period 
is positive and signiﬁ  cant for the shocks affecting interest 
rates, investment, the labour supply, the price mark-up 
and ﬁ  nancing costs.
If we look at the correlation between the shocks during 
the three synchronised recession periods (1974.1-1975.1, 
1980.1-1982.4, 2000.2-2002.2), we ﬁ  nd  a  very  strong 
positive correlation in the case of six shocks  : those con-
cerning interest rates, investment, preferences, the labour 
supply, ﬁ  nancing costs and the price mark-up. During the 
recession period there is therefore in fact a very close cor-
relation which occurs mainly in shocks affecting demand. 
The international recessions are therefore evidently due 
mainly to common shocks affecting the economy princi-
pally on the demand side, so that a globally synchronised 
recession, such as that in 2001, appears to be the rule 
rather than the exception. Consequently, the lower corre-
lation during the 1990s is due more to the relatively small 
size of the simultaneous shocks which occurred during 
that period, as already stated in the preceding section. 
However, this is not very promising for the future, since 
there remains a real risk of larger, simultaneous shocks. 
Over-optimistic predictions concerning the stability of the 
real economy and the more efﬁ  cient stabilisation policy 























































































































































CHART 11  SYNCHRONISATION OF GDP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EURO AREA




This article describes the pattern of economic activity in 
the euro area and in the US on the basis of a general 
equilibrium model. Such a model makes it possible to ana-
lyse the empirical data in a strictly theoretical framework. 
That may produce some interesting ﬁ  ndings,  though 
other theoretical models could perhaps produce different 
conclusions. The explanatory and forecasting capability of 
the various models therefore needs to be tested using the 
latest estimation methods.
Comparison of the pattern of economic activity in the 
euro area and in the US revealed that the two econo-
mies have strong similarities  : there are no signiﬁ  cant 
divergences in the behavioural parameters of either the 
private sector or the monetary authority, and the various 
exogenous shocks which are the driving force behind the 
economic cycles in these models appear comparable in 
terms of size and persistence. In the future, by expand-
ing the model (e.g. with a more detailed labour market, 
public sector and an open economy dimension) it should 
be possible to reconcile the interpretation of these exog-
enous shocks with institutional, structural or discretionary 
changes to economic policy.
In the short term, the economic cycles seem to be gener-
ated mainly by demand shocks (shocks affecting prefer-
ences and investment, exogenous demand shocks and 
monetary shocks). During recession periods, in particular, 
simultaneous demand shocks affecting consumption 
and investment spending evidently play a key role. In 
TABLE 4 INTERNATIONAL CORRELATION BETWEEN GROWTH IN THE EURO AREA AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Correlation between the euro area and the US
Changes quarter-on-quarter Average changes year-on-year
1960-2003 1960-1983 1984-2003 Recessions 1960-2003 1960-1983 1984-2003 Recessions
GDP growth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.43 0.50 0.27 0.40
1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003 Recessions 1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003 recessions
GDP growth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.31 0.40 0.20 0.26 0.39 0.51 0.23 0.34
Consumption growth  . . . . . . . . 0.25 0.45 0.08 0.57 0.21 0.42 0.04 0.29
Investment growth  . . . . . . . . . . 0.31 0.40 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.51 –0.07 0.36
Employment growth  . . . . . . . . . 0.05 0.26 –0.14 0.25 0.07 0.43 –0.21 0.50
Growth of real wages . . . . . . . . 0.00 –0.05 0.05 –0.22 0.04 0.35 0.01 –0.23
Change in inflation  . . . . . . . . . . –0.07 –0.12 –0.02 0.21 0.17 0.35 –0.18 0.21
Change in short-term interest 
rate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.40 4.47 0.19 0.59 0.56 0.71 0.23 0.84
Correlation between shocks in the euro area and in the US
Quarter-on-quarter Average over four quarters
1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003 Recessions 1974-2003 1974-1983 1984-2003 Recessions
TFP productivity shock . . . . . . . . 0.03 –0.01 0.07 –0.47 –0.12 –0.10 –0.14 –0.36
Labour supply shock  . . . . . . . . . 0.09 0.29 –0.20 0.56 0.20 0.50 –0.41 0.79
Investment shock   . . . . . . . . . . . 0.09 0.29 –0.20 0.56 0.20 0.50 –0.41 0.79
Intertemp. pref. shock . . . . . . . . 0.18 0.36 0.02 0.53 0.45 0.54 0.37 0.69
Exog. spending shock  . . . . . . . . 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.01 –0.01 0.06 0.16
Monetary policy shock   . . . . . . . 0.46 0.56 0.28 0.65 0.67 0.80 0.44 0.77
Inflation target shock   . . . . . . . . 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.31 0.11 –0.01
Financing shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.50 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.39
Price mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . . –0.07 –0.17 0.04 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.38
Wage mark-up shock  . . . . . . . . 0.06 –0.03 0.07 0.05 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.0981
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the longer term, shocks affecting the labour supply and 
productivity are the driving force. As regards inﬂ  ation, the 
main factors in the short term are temporary mark-up 
shocks, although in the long term inﬂ  ation is primarily a 
monetary phenomenon, inﬂ  uenced by the central bank’s 
inﬂ  ation target. The limited impact of monetary shocks on 
the real economy does not imply that monetary policy is 
of no signiﬁ  cance. The systematic behaviour of the central 
bank is important in order to understand how the other 
shocks affect the economy. It is here that an efﬁ  cient 
monetary policy can contribute to more stable and efﬁ  -
cient economic growth.
The reduction in the volatility of real growth in both the 
euro area and the United States, especially since the mid 
1980s, is due mainly to the fact that the exogenous 
shocks were smaller. Changes in the economic structure 
or dynamics and a more efﬁ  cient monetary policy are not 
in themselves sufﬁ  cient to explain the sharp reduction in 
real volatility. These same ﬁ  ndings can also help to explain 
the synchronisation of the business cycles between the 
two economic blocs. Despite the globalisation of the 
economy, there is no clear trend towards a closer correla-
tion in economic growth. The small scale of the simultane-
ous – predominantly demand-related – shocks occurring 
in the recent period may provide some explanation. In the 
absence of severe synchronised shocks, shocks speciﬁ  c to 
particular countries or sectors remain relatively important 
for the pattern of economic activity. As far as the future is 
concerned, this implies that it would be wrong to be over-
optimistic about the dynamic stability of the economy or 
the efﬁ  ciency of the stabilisation policy.82
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